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Tremendous research effort has been dedicated over the years to thoroughly investigate non-monotonic
reasoning. With the abundance of non-monotonic logical formalisms, a unified theory that enables
comparing the different approaches is much called for. In this paper, we present an algebraic graded
logic we refer to as LogAG capable of encompassing a wide variety of non-monotonic formalisms.
We build on Lin and Shoham’s argument systems first developed to formalize non-monotonic com-
monsense reasoning. We show how to encode argument systems as LogAG theories, and prove that
LogAG captures the notion of belief spaces in argument systems. Since argument systems capture de-
fault logic, autoepistemic logic, the principle of negation as failure, and circumscription, our results
show that LogAG captures the before-mentioned non-monotonic logical formalisms as well. Previous
results show that LogAG subsumes possibilistic logic and any non-monotonic inference relation sat-
isfying Makinson’s rationality postulates. In this way, LogAG provides a powerful unified framework
for non-monotonicity.
1 Introduction
Non-monotonic logics are attempts to model commonsense defeasible reasoning that allows making
plausible, albeit possibly fallible, assumptions about the world in the absence of complete knowledge.
The term “non-monotonic” refers to the fact that new evidence can retract previous contradicting assump-
tions. This contrasts with classical logics where new evidence never invalidates previous assumptions
about the world. Modelling non-monotonicity has been the focus of extensive studies in the knowledge
representation and reasoning community for many years giving rise to a vast family of non-monotonic
formalisms. The currently existing approaches to representing non-monotonicity can be classified into
two orthogonal families: fixed point logics and model preference logics [4]. Fixed point logics define
a fixed point operator by which possibly multiple sets of consistent beliefs can be constructed. Typi-
cal non-monotonic logics taking the fixed point approach are Reiter’s default logic [27] and Moore’s
autoepistemic logic [23, 20]. Model preference logics, on the other hand, define non-monotonic logi-
cal inference relations with respect to selected preferred models of the world. Typical model preference
logics are probabilistic logic [1, 26], McCarthy’s circumscription [21], system P proposed by Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor [18], and Pearl’s system Z [25]. The wide diversity of all of these logics in addi-
tion to their non-standard semantics has rendered the task of gaining a good understanding of them quite
hard. For this reason, a unified theory that enables comparing the different approaches is much called for.
The purpose of this paper is to present an algebraic graded logic we refer to as LogAG [17, 11, 12] capa-
ble of encompassing the previously-mentioned non-monotonic logics providing a general framework for
non-monotonicity.
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Another non-standard attempt at formalizing commonsense non-monotonic reasoning is Lin and
Shoham’s argument systems [19]. Argument systems are considered a radical departure from the clas-
sical sentence-based approaches as they are based entirely on inference rules. In [19], Lin and Shoham
prove that classical non-monotonic approaches such as default logic [27], autoepistemic logic [23], cir-
cumscription [21], and the principle of negation as failure [7] are all special cases of argument systems.
In this paper, we show that argument systems can be embedded in LogAG proving that LogAG cap-
tures the same non-monotonic logical approaches that argument systems capture. In [13], we proved that
LogAG subsumes possibilistic logic [9] and any non-monotonic inference relation satisfying Makinson’s
rationality postulates. While other unifying frameworks for non-monotonic formalisms such as [3, 5] ex-
ist in the literature, non of these frameworks can capture weighted approaches such as possibilistic logic
while encompassing the classical previously-mentioned logical approaches like LogAG does. In this way,
LogAG can be considered a powerful algebraic unified framework for non-monotonicity providing a uni-
fied understanding of a vast diversity of non-monotonic logical formalisms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, LogAG will be thoroughly reviewed
describing its syntax and semantics. Section 3 will briefly review argument systems. In Section 4, the
main results of this paper, proving that LogAG subsumes argument systems, will be presented. Finally,
some concluding remarks are outlined in Section 5.
2 LogAG
LogAG is a graded logic for reasoning with uncertain beliefs. “Log” stands for logic, “A” for algebraic,
and “G” for grades. In LogAG, a classical logical formula could be associated with a grade represent-
ing a measure of its uncertainty. Non-graded formulas are taken to be certain. In this way, LogAG is a
logic for reasoning about graded propositions. LogAG is algebraic in that it is a language of only terms,
some of which denote propositions. Both propositions and their grades are taken as individuals in the
LogAG ontology. While some multimodal logics such as [8, 22] may be used to express graded grading
propositions too, unlike LogAG, the grades themselves are embedded in the modal operators and are not
amenable to reasoning and quantification. This makes LogAG a quite expressive language that is still
intuitive and very similar in syntax to first-order logic. LogAG is demonstrably useful in commonsense
reasoning including default reasoning, reasoning with information provided by a chain of sources of
varying degrees of trust, and reasoning with paradoxical sentences as discussed in [11, 17].
While most of the graded logics we are aware of employ non-classical modal logic semantics by
assigning grades to possible worlds [10], LogAG is a non-modal logic with classical notions of worlds
and truth values. This is not to say that LogAG is a classical logic, but it is closer in spirit to classical non-
monotonic logics such as default logic and circumscription. Following these formalisms, LogAG assumes
a classical notion of logical consequence on top of which a more restrictive, non-classical relation is
defined selecting only a subset of the classical models. In defining this relation we take the algebraic,
rather than the modal, route. The remaining of this section is dedicated to reviewing the syntax and
semantics of LogAG. A sound and complete proof theory for LogAG is presented in [17, 11]. In [17], it
was proven that LogAG is a stable and well-behaved logic observing Makinson’s properties of reflexivity,
cut, and cautious monotony.
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2.1 LogAG Syntax
LogAG consists of algebraically constructed terms from function symbols. There are no sentences in
LogAG; instead, we use terms of a distinguished syntactic type to denote propositions. LogAG is a vari-
ant of LogAB [15] and LogAS [16], which are algebraic languages for reasoning about, respectively,
beliefs and temporal phenomena. Propositions are included as first-class individuals in the LogAG ontol-
ogy and are structured in a Boolean algebra giving us all standard truth conditions and classical notions
of consequence and validity. The inclusion of propositions in the ontology, though non-standard, has
been suggested by several authors [6, 2, 24, 29]. We refer the reader to [15, 29] for arguments in favour
of adopting this approach in the representation of propositional attitudes in artificial intelligence. Addi-
tionally, grades are introduced as first-class individuals in the ontology. As a result, propositions about
graded propositions can be constructed, which are themselves recursively gradable.
A LogAG language is a many-sorted language composed of a set of terms partitioned into three
base sorts: σP is a set of terms (including the term true) denoting propositions, σD is a set of terms
denoting grades, and σI is a set of terms denoting anything else. A LogAG alphabet includes a non-
empty, countable set of constant and function symbols each having a syntactic sort from the set σ =
{σP,σD,σI}∪ {τ1 −→ τ2 | τ1 ∈ {σP,σD,σI}} and τ2 ∈ σ} of syntactic sorts. Intuitively, τ1 −→ τ2 is
the syntactic sort of function symbols that take a single argument of sort σP, σD, or σI and produce a
functional term of sort τ2. Given the restriction of the first argument of function symbols to base sorts,
LogAG is, in a sense, a first-order language. In addition, an alphabet includes a countably infinite set
of variables of the three base sorts; a set of syncategorematic symbols including the comma, various
matching pairs of brackets and parentheses, and the symbol ∀; and a set of logical symbols defined as the
union of the following sets: {¬}⊆σP−→σP, {∧,∨}⊆σP−→σP−→σP, {≺, .=}⊆σD−→σD−→σP,
and {G} ⊆ σP −→ σD −→ σP. Terms involving⊃ 1 and ∃ can always be expressed in terms of the above
logical operators and ∀. The terms containing G are referred to grading terms, while the terms not
including G are referred to as non-grading terms.
The following are some examples of well-formed σP terms permissible by the syntax of LogAG.
1. ∀d1,d2[d1 .= d2 ⊃ d2 .= d1]
2. ∀d1,d2[¬(d1 ≺ d2)⇔ (d2 ≺ d1∨d2 .= d1)]
3. G(P,2)
4. ∀x[P(x)⊃G(Q(x),5)]
5. G(∀x[P(x)⊃ ¬Q(x)],10)
6. G(G(G(R,2),3),12)
The first two well-formed terms denote properties of grades: (1) denotes the proposition that the
equality relation of grades is symmetric, and (2) denotes the proposition that the ordering of grades is
linear. (3) denotes the proposition that the grade of P is 2. (4) and (5) illustrate the de re and de dicto
grading, respectively. The syntax of LogAG allows the nesting of grading terms forming grading chains
as shown in (6). One possible use of such nesting is to express information from various knowledge
sources with different trust degrees [17].
1Through out this paper, we will use ⊃ to denote material implication.
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2.2 From Syntax to Semantics
A key element in the semantics of LogAG is the notion of a LogAG structure.
Definition 2.1. A LogAG structure is a quintuple S= 〈D,A,g,<,e〉, where
• D, the domain of discourse, is a set with two disjoint, non-empty, countable subsets: a set of
propositions P, and a set of grades G.
• A= 〈P,+, ·,−,⊥,>〉 is a complete, non-degenerate Boolean algebra.
• g : P×G−→ P is a grading function.
• <: G×G−→ P is an ordering function.
• e : G×G−→ {⊥,>} is an equality function, where for every g1,g2 ∈ G:
e(g1,g2) => if g1 = g2, and e(g1,g2) =⊥ otherwise.
A valuation V of a LogAG language is a triple 〈S,V f ,Vx〉, where S is a LogAG structure, V f is a
function that assigns to each function symbol an appropriate function onD, and Vx is a function mapping
each variable to a corresponding element of the appropriate block ofD. An interpretation of LogAG terms
is given by a function [[·]]V. Figure 1 summarizes the operation of [[·]]V.
Figure 1: The interpretation of the LogAG terms.
Definition 2.2. Let L be a LogAG language and let V be a valuation of L. An interpretation of the terms
of L is given by a function [[·]]V:
• [[true]]V =>
• [[x]]V = Vx(x), for a variable x
• [[c]]V = V f (c), for a constant c
• [[ f (t1, . . . , tn)]]V = V f ( f )([[t1]]V, . . . , [[tn]]V), for an n-adic (n≥ 1) function symbol f
• [[(t1∧ t2)]]V = [[t1]]V · [[t2]]V
• [[(t1∨ t2)]]V = [[t1]]V+[[t2]]V
• [[¬t]]V =−[[t]]V
• [[∀x(t)]]V = ∏
a∈D
[[t]]V[a/x]
• [[G(t1, t2)]]V = g([[t1]]V, [[t2]]V)
• [[t1 ≺ t2]]V = [[t1]]V < [[t2]]V
• [[t1 .= t2]]V = e([[t1]]V, [[t2]]V)
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2.3 Beyond Classical Logical Consequence
We define logical consequence using the familiar notion of filters from Boolean algebra [28].
Definition 2.3. A filter of a boolean algebra A= 〈P,+, ·,−,⊥,>〉 is a subset F of P such that:
1. > ∈ F;
2. If a,b ∈ F, then a ·b ∈ F; and
3. If a ∈ F and a≤ b, then b ∈ F.
A propositional term φ is a logical consequence of a set of propositional terms Γ if it is a member of
the filter of the interpretation of Γ, denoted F([[Γ]]V).
Definition 2.4. Let L be a LogAG language. For every φ ∈ σP and Γ ⊆ σP, φ is a logical consequence
of Γ, denoted Γ |= φ , if, for every L-valuation V, [[φ ]]V ∈ F([[Γ]]V) where [[Γ]]V =∏
γ∈Γ
[[γ]]V.
Unfortunately, the definition of logical consequence presented in the previous definition cannot ad-
dress uncertain reasoning with graded propositions. To see that, consider the following situation. You
see a bird from far away that looks a lot like a penguin. You know that any penguin has wings but does
not fly. To make sure that what you see is indeed a penguin, you ask your brother who tells you that this
bird must not be a penguin since your sister told him that she saw the same bird flying. This situation
can be represented in LogAG by a set of propositions Q as shown in Figure 2 where p denotes that the
bird is a penguin, w denotes has wings, and f denotes that the bird flies. For the ease of readability
of Figure 2, we write ¬φ instead of −φ and φ ⊃ ψ instead of −φ +ψ . Since you are uncertain about
whether the bird you see is a penguin, this is represented as a graded proposition g(p,d1) where d1 is
your uncertainty degree in what you see. What your brother tells you is represented by the grading chain
g(g( f ,d2),d3) where d3 represents how much you trust your brother, and d2 represents how much you
trust your sister. Now, consider an agent reasoning with the set Q. Initially, it would make sense for the
agent to be able to conclude p even if p is uncertain (and, hence, graded) since it has no reason to believe
¬p. The filter F(Q), however, contains the classical logical consequences of Q, but will never contain
the graded proposition p. For this reason, we extend our classical notion of filters into a more liberal
notion of graded filters to enable the agent to conclude, in addition to the classical logical consequences
of Q, propositions that are graded in Q (like p) or follow from graded propositions in Q (like ¬ f and w).
This should be done without introducing inconsistencies. Due to nested grading, graded filters come in
degrees depending on the depth of nesting of the admitted graded propositions. In Figure 2, F1(Q) is the
graded filter of degree 1. F1(Q) contains everything in F(Q) in addition to the nested graded proposi-
tions at depth 1, p and g( f ,d2). ¬ f and w are also admitted to F1(Q) since they follow classically from
{p, p ⊃ ¬ f} and {p, p ⊃ w} respectively. Consequently, at degree 1, we end up believing that the bird
is a penguin that has wings and does not fly. To compute the graded filter of degree 2, F2(Q), we take
everything in F1(Q) and try to add the graded proposition f at depth 2. The problem is, once we do that,
we have a contradiction with ¬ f (we now believe that bird flies and does not fly at the same time). To
resolve the contradiction, we admit to F2(Q) either p (and consequently ¬ f and w) or f . In deciding
which of p or f to kick out we will allude to their grades. The grade of p is d1, and f is graded in a
grading chain containing d2 and d3. To get a fused grade for f , we will combine both d2 and d3 using an
appropriate fusion operator. If d1 is less than the fused grade of f , p will not be admitted to the graded
filter, together with it consequence ¬ f . Otherwise, f will not be admitted, and p and ¬ f will remain. If
we try to compute F3(Q), we get everything in F2(Q) reaching a fixed point.
In general, the elements of Fi(Q) will be referred to as the graded consequences at level i. The
rest of this section is dedicated to formally defining graded filters together with our graded consequence
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Figure 2: Graded Filters
relation based on graded filters. In the sequel, for every p∈P and g∈ G, g(p,g) will be taken to represent
a grading proposition that grades p. Moreover, if g(p,g) ∈ Q ⊆ P, then p is graded in Q. The set of p
graders in Q is defined to be the set Graders(p,Q) = {q|q ∈ Q and q grades p}. Throughout, a LogAG
structure S= 〈D,A,g,<,e〉 is assumed.
As a building step towards formalizing the notion of a graded filter, the structure of graded proposi-
tions should be carefully specified. For this reason, the following notion of an embedded proposition is
defined.
Definition 2.5. Let Q ⊆ P. A proposition p ∈ P is embedded in Q if (i) p ∈ Q (ii) or if, for some g ∈ G,
g(p,g) is embedded in Q. Henceforth, let E(Q) = {p|p is embedded in Q}.
Since a graded proposition p might be embedded at any depth n ∈ N, the degree of embedding of a
graded proposition p is defined as follows.
Definition 2.6. For Q⊆ P, let the degree of embedding of p in Q be a function δQ : E(Q)−→ N, where
1. if p ∈ Q, then δQ(p) = 0; and
2. if p /∈ Q, then δQ(p) = e+1, where e = minq∈Graders(p,E(Q)){δQ(q)}.
For notational convenience, we let the set of embedded propositions at depth n be En(Q) = {p ∈
E(Q) | δQ(p)≤ n}, for every n ∈ N.
The key to defining graded filters is the intuition that the set of consequences of a proposition set
Q may be further enriched by telescoping Q and accepting some of the propositions graded therein. We
refer to this process as telescoping as the set of graded filters at increasing depths looks like an inverted
telescope (as illustrated in Figure 2). For this, we need to define (i) the process of telescoping, which
is a step-wise process that considers propositions at increasing grading depths, and (ii) a criterion for
accepting graded propositions which, as mentioned before, depends on the grades of said propositions.
Since the nesting of grading chains is permissible in LogAG, it is necessary to compute the fused grade
of a graded proposition p in a chain C to decide whether it will be accepted or not. The fusion of grades
in a chain is done according to an operator ⊗. Further, since a graded proposition p might be graded by
more than one grading chain, we define the notion of the fused grade of p across all the chains grading it
by an operator ⊕.
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Definition 2.7. Let S be a LogAG structure with a depth- and fan-out-bounded P 2. A telescoping
structure for S is a quadruple T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉, where
• T ⊆ P, referred to as the top theory;
• O is an ultrafilter of the subalgebra induced by Range(<) (an ultrafilter is a maximal filter with
respect to not including ⊥) [28];
• ⊗ :⋃∞i=1Gi −→ G; and ⊕ :⋃∞i=1Gi −→ G.
Recasting the familiar notion of a kernel of a belief base [14] into the context of LogAG structures,
we say that a ⊥-kernel of Q ⊆ P is a subset-minimal inconsistent set X ⊆ Q such that F(E(F(X))) is
improper (= P) where E(F(X)) is the set of all embedded graded propositions in the filter of X. Let
Q  ⊥ be the set of Q kernels that entail ⊥. A proposition p ∈ X survives X in T if p is not the weakest
proposition (with the least grade) in X. In what follows, the fused grade of a proposition p in Q ⊆ P
according to a telescoping structure T will be referred to as fT(p,Q).
Definition 2.8. For a telescoping structure T = 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉 and a fan-in-bounded 3 Q ⊆ P, if X ⊆ Q,
then p ∈ X survives X given T if
1. p is ungraded in Q; or
2. there is some ungraded q ∈ X such that q /∈ F(T); or
3. there is some graded q ∈ X such that q /∈ F(T) and (fT(q,Q)< fT(p,Q)) ∈O.
The set of kernel survivors of Q given T is the set
κ(Q,T) = {p ∈ Q | if p ∈ X ∈ Q ⊥ then p survives X given T}.
The notion of a proposition p being supported in Q is defined as follows.
Definition 2.9. Let Q,T ⊆ P. We say that p is supported in Q given T if
1. p ∈ F(T); or
2. there is a grading chain 〈q0,q1, . . . ,qn〉 of p in Q with q0 ∈ F(R) where every member of R is
supported in Q.
The set of propositions supported in Q given T is denoted by ς(Q,T).
Observation 2.1. ς(Q,T) = F(T)∪EG, for some set EG of embedded graded propositions in Q.
The T-induced telescoping of Q is defined as the set of propositions supported given T in the set of
kernel survivors of E1(F(Q)).
Definition 2.10. Let T be a telescoping structure for S. If Q⊂ P such that E1(F(Q)) is fan-in-bounded,
then the T-induced telescoping of Q is given by
τT(Q) = ς(κ(E1(F(Q)),T),T).
Observation 2.2. If F(T) is proper, then F(ς(κ(Q,T),T)) is proper.
Proof. If F(ς(κ(Q,T),T)) is not proper, then ς(κ(Q,T),T) has at least one kernel X∈Q ⊥. According
to Definitions 2.8 and 2.9, this can only happen if X⊆ T. Thus, F(T) is proper.
2P is depth-bounded if every grading chain has at most d distinct grading propositions and is fan-out-bounded if every
grading proposition grades at most fout propositions where d, fout ∈ N [11].
3Q is fan-in-bounded if every graded proposition is graded by at most fin grading propositions where fin ∈ N [11].
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Definition 2.11. If F(Q) has finitely-many grading propositions, then τT(Q) is defined, for every tele-
scoping structure T. Hence, provided that the right-hand side is defined, let
τnT(Q) =
{
Q if n = 0
τT(τn−1T (Q)) otherwise
A graded filter of a top theory T, denoted Fn(T), is defined as the filter of the T-induced telescoping
of T of degree n.
In the following example, we now go back to the example we introduced at the beginning of this
section in Figure 2. We show how the formal construction of the graded filters matches the intuitions we
pointed out earlier.
Example 2.1. Consider Q = {−p+− f , − p+w, g(p,2),g(g( f ,2),3)} and T = 〈Q,O,⊗,⊕〉 where
⊕= max, and ⊗= mean. In what follows, let τnT be an abbreviation for τnT(Q).
• τ0T = Q
• τ1T = τT(τ0T) = ς(κ(E1(F(Q)),T),T)
F(Q) Q∪{−p+− f .g(p,2), g(g( f ,2),3)+g(p,2), ...}
E1(F(Q) F(Q) ∪ {p, g( f ,2)}
κ(E1(F(Q),T)) F(Q) ∪ {p, g( f ,2)}
ς(κ(E1(F(Q),T),Q) F(Q) ∪ {p, g( f ,2)}
F1(T) F(τ1T) = {p,w,− f , ...}
Upon telescoping to degree 1, there are no contradictions in E1(F(Q)) (no ⊥−kernel X⊆ E1(F(Q)).
Hence, everything in E1(F(Q)) survives telescoping and is supported (notice the equality of E1(F(Q)),
the kernel survivors, and the supported propositions in E1(F(Q))). At level 1, we believe that the bird
we saw is indeed a penguin and accordingly has wings and does not fly.
• τ2T = τT(τ1T) = ς(κ(E1(F(τ1T)),T),Q)
E1(F(τ1T)) F(τ
1
T)∪{ f}
κ(E1(F(τ1T)),T) E
1(F(τ1T))−{p}
ς(κ(E1(F(τ1T)),T),Q) κ(E
1(F(τ1T)),T)−{− f ,w}
F2(T) F(τ2T)
Upon telescoping to degree 2, there are two ⊥−kernels { f ,− f} and {p,−p+− f , f}. − f survives
the first kernel as it is not graded in Q. f survives the first kernel as well as it is the only graded
proposition in the kernel with another member − f /∈ F(Q). p does not survive the second kernel as
the kernel contains another graded proposition f and the grade of p (2) is less than the fused grade
of f (mean(2,3) = 2.5). Accordingly, − f loses its support and is not supported in the set of kernel
survivors. The graded filter of degree 2 does not contain p or − f , but w is retained as it has nothing to
do with the contradiction. At level 2, we start taking into account the information our brother told us.
Since our combined trust in our brother and sister is higher that our trust in what we saw, we end up
not believing that the bird we saw is a penguin since we believe that it flies.
• τ3T = τT(τ2T)
τ3T = ς(κ(E
1(F(τ2T)),T),Q) = κ(E
1(F(τ2T)),T)
F3(T) = F(τ3T) = F
2(T) reaching a fixed point.
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Henceforth, given a LogAG theory T ⊆ σP and a valuation V = 〈S,V f ,Vx〉, let the valuation of T
be denoted as V(T) = {[[p]]V | p ∈ T}. We use graded filters to define graded consequence as follows.
Further, for a LogAG structure S, an S grading canon is a triple C = 〈⊗,⊕,n〉 where n ∈ N and ⊗ and
⊕ are as indicated in Definition 2.7.
Definition 2.12. LetT be a LogAG theory. For every p∈σP, valuationV= 〈S,V f ,Vx〉whereS has a set
P which is depth- and fan-out-bounded, and S grading canon C= 〈⊗,⊕,n〉, p is a graded consequence
of T with respect to C, denoted T |'C p, if Fn(T) is defined and [[p]]V ∈ Fn(T) for every telescoping
structure T= 〈V(T),O,⊗,⊕〉 for S where O extends F(V(T)∩Range(<))4.
It is worth noting that |'C reduces to |= if n = 0 or if F(E(V(T))) does not contain any grading
propositions. However, unlike |=, |'C is non-monotonic in general. In what follows, let TC = {p | T |'C
p}. When we are considering a set of canons which only differ in the value of n, we write Tn instead of
TC.
The upcoming example showcases the operation of LogAG on the classical non-monotonic reasoning
example of birds fly, but penguins are special birds that do not fly.
Example 2.2. Consider the following LogAG theory TOT 1.
1. ∀x[Bird(x)⊃G(Flies(x),5)]
2. ∀x[Penguin(x)⊃G(¬Flies(x),10)]
3. ∀x[Penguin(x)⊃ Bird(x)]
4. Penguin(Opus)
5. Bird(Tweety)
We show next the relevant graded consequences ofTOT 1 with respect to a series of canons, with 0≤ n≤ 1.
n = 0 0.1. TOT1
0.2. Bird(Opus)
0.3. G(Flies(Tweety),5)
0.4. G(Flies(Opus),5)
0.5. G(¬Flies(Opus),10)
n = 1 1.1. Everything at n = 0
1.2. Flies(Tweety)
1.3. ¬Flies(Opus)
Upon telescoping to n= 1, we believe that Tweety flies and Opus does not fly. The embedded propo-
sition that Opus flies does not survive telescoping since we trust that Opus does not fly, being a penguin,
more than we trust that it flies, being a bird. T1OT 1 is a fixed point.
Now, consider the theory TOT2 which is similar to TOT1, but with propositions (1) and (2) replaced
by “G(∀x[Bird(x)⊃ Flies(x),5)” and “G(∀x[Penguin(x)⊃¬Flies(x),10)”, respectively. Thus, we trade
the “de re” representation of TOT1 for the “de dicto” representation in TOT2. This change results in a
change in the fixed point that we reach. In T1OT2, as in T1OT1, we end up believing that Opus does not fly.
Unlike T1OT1 however, we give up our belief in the proposition that birds fly and, hence, cannot conclude
that Tweety flies. Being able to grade only the consequent in LogAG, as in TOT1, allows us to give up
believing that Opus flies while keeping the rule ∀x[Bird(x) ⊃ G(Flies(x),5)] which allows to conclude
that Tweety flies. Grading only part of the rule is one of the strengths of LogAG which is not the possible
in many weighted logics.
4An ultrafilter U extends a filter F , if F ⊆U .
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3 Argument Systems
Argument systems [19] assume a logical language L which is a set of well-formed formulas (wffs)
restricted to contain ¬φ if φ is itself a wff. The operator ¬ has no logical properties in argument systems.
The most distinctive feature of argument systems is that they are based entirely on inference rules which
are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. An inference rule is a rule of the following formats:
1. A, where A is a wff. This is called a base fact.
2. A1, ...,Am→ B. This is called a monotonic rule.
3. A1, ...,Am⇒ B. This is called a non-monotonic rule.
By chaining rules together, we get arguments which are used to establish propositions.
Definition 3.2. Let R be a set of rules. An argument in R is a rooted tree with labelled arcs defined as
follows:
1. If A is a base fact, the tree consisting of only A as a root is an argument.
2. If p1, ..., pm are arguments whose roots are A1, ...,Am, and A1, ...,Am → B (A1, ...,Am ⇒ B) ∈ R
such that B is not a node in the trees p1, ..., pm, then the tree p with B as its root and p1, ..., pm
as its immediate subtrees is an argument. All the arcs from B to its children is labelled by the
monotonic (non-monotonic) rule.
An argument p is said to be for φ (or φ is supported by p) if φ is the root of p. By grouping arguments
together, we get an argument structure. An argument structure can be thought of as the set of logically
consistent arguments held by the agent.
Definition 3.3. Let R be a set of rules, an argument structure T is defined as follows:
1. if p is a base fact, then p ∈ T .
2. ∀p ∈ T , if p′ is a subtree of p, then p′ ∈ T (T is closed)
3. if p is formed from p1, ..., pn ∈ T by a monotonic rule, then p ∈ T (T is monotonically closed).
4. ∀φ ∈ L, T does not contain arguments for both φ and ¬φ (T is consistent).
For argument structures, a notion of completeness is defined with respect to a formula φ as follows.
Definition 3.4. An argument structure T is complete with respect to φ if T contains an argument for
either φ or ¬φ .
Finally, the belief space of an agent is defined as the set of formulas supported by an argument
structure.
Definition 3.5. The set of formulas supported by an argument structure T , W f f (T ) = {φ | ∃p ∈ T such
that φ is supported by p}.
The resulting framework made up of the inference rule, arguments, and argument structures is re-
ferred to as an argument system.
Example 3.1. This example is due to [19]. Let R be the following set of rules:
r1 : true
r2 : penguin(A)
r3 : penguin(A)→ bird(A)
r4 : bird(A),¬abnormal(bird(A))→ f lies(A)
r5 : penguin(A),¬abnormal(penguin(A))→¬ f lies(A)
r6 : penguin(A)→ abnormal(bird(A))
r7 : true⇒¬abnormal(penguin(A))
r8 : true⇒¬abnormal(bird(A))
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There are 8 possible arguments in R:
p1 : true
p2 : penguin(A)
p3 : p2 r3−→ bird(A)
p4 : p2 r6−→ abnormal(bird(A))
p5 : p1 r7=⇒¬abnormal(penguin(A))
p6 : p1 r8=⇒¬abnormal(bird(A))
p7 : p3, p6 r4−→ f lies(A)
p8 : p2, p5 r5−→¬ f lies(A)
Further, there are two possible argument structures:
T1 : {p1, p2, p3, p4}
T2 : {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p8}
Only T2 is complete with respect to both abnormal(bird(A)) and abnormal(penguin(A)).
4 Argument Systems in LogAG
In this section, we show how to encode argument systems in LogAG theories, and prove that the LogAG
graded consequence relation can capture the notions of argument structures and supported propositions
by an argument structure. We start by presenting a mapping function from the inference rules of argument
systems to LogAG propositional terms.
Definition 4.1. Let the mapping pi : R→ σP from a set of inference rules R of an argument system to a
set of LogAG propositional terms be defined as follows.
1. If A is a base fact, pi(A) = A.
2. If A1, ...,Am→ B is a monotonic rule, pi(A1, ...,Am→ B) = (∧mi=1 Ai)⊃ B.
3. If A1, ...,Am⇒ B is a non-monotonic rule, pi(A1, ...,Am⇒ B) = (∧mi=1 Ai)⊃ B.
Whenever S is a set of rules, pi(S) = {pi(φ) | φ ∈ S}.
While the mapping function pi maps monotonic and non-monotonic rules to similar LogAG propo-
sitional terms, the corresponding mappings will be treated differently when the corresponding LogAG
theory is constructed as will be shown below.
The following definition describes how to use the mapping function pi to construct LogAG theories
capable of capturing argument structures and supported propositions in argument structures.
In the sequel, let the function chain(φ ,d) mapping a rule φ to a LogAG term denoting a grading
proposition be defined as follows.
chain(φ ,d) =
{
G(φ ,1) if d = 1
G(chain(φ ,d−1),1) otherwise.
Further, let℘(S) be the set of non-empty subsets of a set S. An indexing of℘(S) is a bijection I :℘(S)→
{1,2, ..., |℘(S)|}.
Definition 4.2. Let R be a set of rules of an argument system with RM ⊆ R and RNM ⊆ R being the sets
of monotonic and non-monotonic rules therein respectively, and let I be an indexing of ℘(RNM). The
I-translation of R to a LogAG theory, referred to as TIR, is the union of a monotonic subtheory MR, and
a non-monotonic subtheory NMIR. MR is the smallest set satisfying the following:
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1. for all base facts A ∈ R, pi(A) ∈MR.
2. for all monotonic rules r ∈ R, pi(r) ∈MR.
The non-monotonic subtheory NMIR is the smallest set satisfying the following:
1. for all S ∈℘(RNM) and r ∈ S, chain(pi(r), I(S)) ∈ NMIR.
2. for all S ∈℘(RNM) and r 6∈ S, chain(pi(r), I(S)) ∈ NMIR and chain(¬pi(r), I(S)) ∈ NMIR.
Example 4.1. Consider the set of rules R of an argument system in Example 3.1. The monotonic sub-
theory MR of the corresponding LogAG translation is made of the following propositional terms:
t1 : true
t2 : penguin(A)
t3 : penguin(A)⊃ bird(A)
t4 : bird(A)∧¬abnormal(bird(A))⊃ f lies(A)
t5 : penguin(A)∧¬abnormal(penguin(A))⊃ ¬ f lies(A)
t6 : penguin(A)⊃ abnormal(bird(A))
The following table shows the sets in℘(RNM) together with the output of a possible indexing I.
I(Si)
S1 {true⇒¬abnormal(penguin(A))} 1
S2 {true⇒¬abnormal(bird(A))} 2
S3 {true⇒¬abnormal(penguin(A)), true⇒¬abnormal(bird(A))} 3
The I-translation to a LogAG theory TR is the union of MR and NMIR. The non-monotonic subtheory
NMIR is made of the following terms:
t7 : G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1)
t8 : G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1)
t9 : G(¬(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A))),1)
t10 : G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1),1)
t11 : G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1),1)
t12 : G(G(¬(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))),1),1)
t13 : G(G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1),1),1)
t14 : G(G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1),1),1)
The basic intuition behind this construction is to capture all the possible argument structures with
one LogAG theory by utilizing the notion of successive levels of graded consequences. The idea is to
construct TIR in a way such that all the rules in any possible argument structure are graded consequences
at some level n. This is accomplished by translating the base facts and monotonic rules to equivalent
LogAG propositional non-graded (hence, certain) terms. In this way, base facts and monotonic rules will
be graded consequences at all levels. The non-monotonic rules will be represented as graded (hence,
uncertain) LogAG propositional terms. Since each argument structure contains any possible subset of
non-monotonic rules, we embed each non-monotonic rule in each possible subset S∈℘(RNM) in a LogAG
grading propositional term at an embedding degree of I(S) (condition 1 of the construction of NMIR). To
make sure that the rules that are graded consequences at level n are only the rules in S, we embed any
rule not in S as well as its negation in a LogAG grading propositional term at an embedding degree of
I(S) (condition 2 of the construction of NMIR). It is worth noting that any possible indexing I is possible
as long as each set in℘(RNM) is assigned a unique index so that all the rules in one set will be embedded
at a different level from the rules in another set.
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Henceforth, let R be a set of inference rules for some argument system with RM ⊆ R and RNM ⊆ R
being the sets of monotonic and non-monotonic rules therein respectively. Throughout, we assume that
RM is consistent. Further, let I be an indexing of ℘(RNM), TIR =MR ∪NMIR be the I-translation to a
LogAG theory, and the set of TIR interpretations be T = V(TIR). Finally, let T be an argument structure
where R(T ) is the set of all base facts in T union the set of all the rules appearing as arc labels in all
arguments in T . The following simple observation follows directly from our construction.
Observation 4.1. Let R be a set of rules of an argument system. For any argument structure T ,
R(T ) = RTM ∪ S where RTM ⊆ RM and either S = ∅ if R(T ) contains no non-monotonic rules, or S ∈
℘(RNM) if R(T ) contains at least one non-monotonic rule where MR∪S is consistent.
The following observation states that, in our construction, the fused grade of pi(r) at level n has a
fused of grade fT([[pi(r)]]V,En(T)) of n if we choose the grade fusion operator ⊗= sum and ⊕= max.
Observation 4.2. For any telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉 with ⊗= sum and ⊕= max,
if chain(pi(r),n) ∈ NMIR, fT([[pi(r)]]V,En(T)) = n.
Proof. Taking the ⊗ as the sum operator and the ⊕ as the max operator, since all grades in all grading
chains in NMIR are 1s, then the interpretation of the embedded rule [[pi(r)]]V at level n has a grade of
n. This is because, even if pi(r) appears graded in shorter chains, the ⊕ operator will set the grade of
[[pi(r)]]V to the deeper depth n.
It follows directly from Observation 4.2 that the rules with higher embedding degrees have higher
grades than the rules with lower embedding degrees.
We introduce the following notation for the ease of readability of our upcoming proofs. Let the set of
embedded graded rules be ERn = {[[pi(r)]]V | chain(pi(r),n) ∈ NMIR and chain(pi(¬r),n) 6∈ NMIR}, and
GT be the set of all grading propositions in En(T). The following observation states that if the filter of the
base facts, the monotonic rules (which we originally assume to be consistent), and the non-monotonic
rules embedded at level n is consistent, then an embedded rule [[pi(r)]]V at level n while [[pi(¬r)]]V is not
embedded at the same level is a member of the graded filter of degree n. The intuition is that [[pi(r)]]V
must have a higher grade given our construction and Observation 4.2.
Observation 4.3. For any telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉 with ⊗= sum and ⊕= max,
if F(V(MR∪ERn) is consistent ( 6=P) and [[pi(r)]]V ∈ERn, then [[pi(r)]]V ∈Fn(T) and [[¬pi(r)]]V 6∈Fn(T).
Proof. Suppose that F(V(MR ∪ ERn) is consistent. If chain(pi(r),n) ∈ NMIR and chain(¬pi(r),n) 6∈
NMIR, then by Observation 4.2, the fused grade of [[pi(r)]]V in En(T) is n. If [[pi(¬r)]]V 6∈ En(F(T)), then
[[pi(r)]]V survives telescoping and is supported at level n and [[pi(r)]]V ∈ Fn(T). Otherwise, if [[pi(¬r)]]V ∈
En(F(T)), we have three cases.
1. [[pi(¬r)]]V ∈ F(T). But this implies that F(V(MR) ∪ ERn) is inconsistent. Hence, we get a contra-
diction; or
2. [[pi(¬r)]]V is embedded in a grading chain of length n. This can not be as chain(¬pi(r),n) 6∈ NMIR;
or
3. [[pi(¬r)]]V is supported by some graded propositions embedded at a degree of at most n. If [[pi(¬r)]]V
is supported by at least a graded proposition with an embedding degree of n, we get a contradiction
as F(V(MR) ∪ ERn) must be inconsistent. Then, it must be that [[pi(¬r)]]V is supported by graded
propositions of embedding degrees less than n. In this case, however, all such graded propositions
will not survive telescoping as [[pi(¬r)]]V has a higher grade depriving [[pi(¬r)]]V of its support. It
follows then that [[pi(r)]]V survives telescoping and is supported at level n. Hence, [[pi(r)]]V ∈Fn(T).
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The following proposition will prove to be very useful in the remaining of this section. It states that
if the filter of the base facts, the monotonic rules (which we originally assume to be consistent), and the
non-monotonic rules embedded at level n is consistent, then the graded filter of degree n is equal to the
valuation of the monotonic subtheory, all the embedded rules in ERn, and all the grading propositions in
GT .
Proposition 4.1. If F(V(MR)∪ ERn) is consistent, then Fn(T) = F(V(MR)∪ ERn ∪ GT) for every
telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,sum,max〉.
Proof. We prove this by showing that F(V(MR) ∪ ERn∪ GT)⊆Fn(T) andFn(T)⊆F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪
GT). Suppose that F(V(MR) ∪ ERn) is consistent. Let [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT . Therefore, it
must be one of the following cases.
1. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR). In this case, [[pi(φ)]]V survives telescoping and is supported at level n since all
members of the top theory T survive telescoping and are supported at all levels.
2. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ ERn. By Observation 4.3, [[pi(φ)]]V survives telescoping and is supported at level n.
3. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ GT . The only possible grading propositions come from NMIR or embedded grading
propositions in NMIR. The interpretations of such grading propositions must survive telescoping
and are supported at level n since such grading propositions are never members of⊥-kernels given
the construction of NMIR.
Hence, V(MR)∪ERn ∪GT survive telescoping and is supported at level n. By the definition of graded
filters then, F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT)⊆ Fn(T).
Now, we proceed to proving that Fn(T) ⊆ F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT). According to Observation 2.1
and the definition of graded filters,Fn(T)=F(F(T) ∪ EG)=F(T ∪ EG)=F(V(MR) ∪ V(NMIR) ∪ EG)
for some set of embedded graded propositions EG in En(T) that survive telescoping and are supported
at level n. Let [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR) ∪ V(NMIR) ∪ EG. Therefore, one of the following cases is true.
1. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR). It follows trivially then that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT .
2. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(NMIR). Hence, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ GT by the definition of GT and the construction of NMIR.
3. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ EG. If [[pi(φ)]]V is a grading proposition, then [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ GT . Otherwise, [[pi(φ)]]V is a
graded proposition, then according to Definition 4.2 either chain(pi(φ),n) ∈ NMIR and
chain(¬pi(φ),n) 6∈ NMIR or chain(pi(φ),n) ∈ NMIR and chain(¬pi(φ),n) ∈ NMIR. However, in the
second case by Observation 4.2 both [[pi(φ)]]V and [[pi(¬φ)]]V have the same grade of n in En(T).
Accordingly, both do not survive telescoping at level n. It must then be that chain(pi(φ),n)∈NMIR
and chain(¬pi(φ),n) 6∈NMIR for [[pi(φ)]]V to survive telescoping at level n according to Observation
4.3. Hence, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ ERn.
Thus, V(MR) ∪ V(NMIR) ∪ EG⊆ V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT . Since filters are monotonic,
then F(V(MR) ∪ V(NMIR) ∪ G)⊆ F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT). Hence, Fn(T) = F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT).
Having stated the previous proposition, we now go back to Example 4.1 to show the sequence of
graded consequences at successive levels.
Example 4.2. We show the relevant graded consequences of TIR in Example 4.1 with respect to a series
of canons, with 0≤ n≤ 3 with ⊗= sum and ⊕= max.
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n = 0 0.1. TIR
0.2. bird(A)
0.3. abnormal(bird(A))
n = 1 1.1. Everything at n = 0
1.2. true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))
1.3. G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1)
1.4. G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1)
1.5. G(¬(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))),1)
1.6. G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1),1)
1.7. G(G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1),1)
1.8. ¬abnormal(penguin(A))
1.9. ¬ f lies(A)
n = 2 2.1. Everything at n = 1 except 1.2, 1.8 and 1.9
2.2. G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)),1)
2.3. G(true⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)),1)
n = 3 3.1. Everything at n = 2
3.2. true⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))
3.3. ¬abnormal(penguin(A))
3.4. ¬ f lies(A)
At n = 0, we get 0.2 as it follows from t2 and t3 and 0.3 as it follows from t2 and t6 (the terms are
shown in Example 4.1). This level of graded consequences corresponds to the supported wffs in the first
argument structure in Example 3.1 (the one containing no non-monotonic rules).
Upon telescoping to n = 1, we get all the graded propositional terms embedded at level 1 in NMIR
(1.2 to 1.7) by Observation 4.3 since F(V(MR)∪ER1) is consistent. As a consequence, we get 1.8 as it
follows from 1.2 and t1 and 1.9 as it follows from t2, t5, and 1.8. Therefore, at level 1 we end up believing
that A is not an abnormal penguin that does not fly. This level of graded consequences corresponds to the
supported wffs in the second argument structure in Example 3.1 (the one containing r7) since pi(r7) is a
graded consequence of TIR at level 1.
Going to level 2, both true ⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)) and ¬(true ⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))) are
extracted with a grade of 2 (recall that embedded rules at level n have a grade of n according to Ob-
servation 4.2). Accordingly, both do not survive telescoping and 1.2 goes away depriving 1.8 and 1.9
of their support. The embedded graded propositional term true ⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)) in 1.3 does not
survive telescoping as well as it contradicts with 0.3. Since the interpretation of 0.3 is in the filter of the
top theory, true ⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)) is kicked out. At level 2, we end up not believing that A is an
abnormal penguin nor do we believe that it flies. This level of graded consequences corresponds, just like
the graded consequences at level 0, to the supported wffs in the first argument structure in Example 3.1.
Upon telescoping to level 3, true ⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A)) comes back as it now has a higher
grade (3) than ¬(true ⊃ ¬abnormal(penguin(A))) (2). Accordingly, we get ¬abnormal(penguin(A))
and ¬ f lies(A) back at level 3. The embedded proposition at level 3 true ⊃ ¬abnormal(bird(A)) still
does not survive telescoping as it contradicts with 0.3. Thus, at level 3, we go back to believing that A is
not an abnormal penguin that does not fly. This level of graded consequences corresponds, just like the
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graded consequences at level 1, to the supported wffs in the first argument structure in Example 3.1.
As illustrated by this example, the set of graded consequences at any level n correspond to the sup-
ported wffs in some argument structure. Whenever F(V(MR)∪ERn) is inconsistent, the inconsistency
will be resolved by kicking out the rules with the least grade. As a result, the set of graded consequences
at such level n corresponds to the supported wffs in some argument structure that uses only the consistent
rules. This is demonstrated at levels 2 and 3 of the previous example.
In the remaining of this section, we prove that using the proposed translation we can capture the
notion of supported wffs in argument structures. We start by proving that the interpretation of the trans-
lation of any base fact or any wff supported by entirely monotonic rules in R is a member of the graded
filters of all degrees n.
Lemma 4.1. For all base facts A ∈ T and all degrees n, it must be that [[pi(A)]]V ∈ Fn(T) and for every
telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉.
Proof. Any base fact A ∈ R (and hence in T by the definition of argument structures), pi(A) is ungraded
in the monotonic subtheory MR according to Definition 4.2. It follows from Observation 2.1 and the
definition of graded filters that [[pi(A)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for every telescoping structure T = 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉 since
all members of the top theory T survive telescoping and are supported at all levels.
Lemma 4.2. Let φ be the root of some argument φ ∈ T where all the arcs in φ are labelled by mono-
tonic rules. It must be that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for all degrees n and for every telescoping structure
T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the height of the argument tree.
Base case: The only argument trees containing single nodes in T are the base facts. Hence, the base case
follows from Lemma 4.1.
Induction hypothesis: If φ is the root of some argument tree φ ∈ T of height at most h, then [[pi(φ)]]V ∈
Fn(T) for all n and for every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉.
Induction step: Suppose that φ is the root of some argument tree φ ∈ T of height h+ 1. Then, there
must be a monotonic rule r = A1, ...,Am → φ ∈ R and, since T is monotonically closed, A1, ...,Am are
roots of argument trees of height at most h in T . Hence, by the induction hypothesis, [[pi(Ai)]]V ∈ Fn(T)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, all n, and every telescoping structure T = 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉. According to Definition 4.2,
pi(r) ∈MR and, hence, [[pi(r)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for all n by the definition of graded filters since all members of
the top theory T survive telescoping and are supported at all levels. It follows then that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T)
as well.
It remains to prove that any wff supported by at least one non-monotonic rule is a member of a graded
filter of some degree n. In order to prove this, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Let R(T ) = RTM ∪S according to Observation 4.1. For all φ ∈ R(T ), pi(φ) ∈ Fn(T) for
every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,sum,max〉 for all n if S=∅ and for n = I(S) otherwise.
Proof. Let φ ∈ R(T ). If S = ∅, then R(T ) = RTM is made up of only monotonic rules and pi(φ) ∈MR
according to Definition 4.2. By the definition of graded filters, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for all n. Otherwise, if
S 6=∅, then according to Definition 4.2, chain(r, I(S)) ∈NMIR and chain(¬r, I(S)) 6∈NMIR. Since T is an
argument structure, it must be that R(T ) = RTM∪S is consistent. Accordingly, pi(R(T )) must be consistent
as well. Hence, it follows from Proposition 4.1 that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) with n = I(S).
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Lemma 4.3. Let φ be the root of some argument φ ∈ T where, if φ has arcs, there is at least one arc in φ
labelled by a non-monotonic rule. Further, let n= I(S)where S∈℘(RNM) contains all the non-monotonic
rules in φ . It must be that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,sum,max〉.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the height of the argument tree.
Base case: The only argument trees containing single nodes in T are the base facts. Hence, the base case
follows from Lemma 4.1.
Induction hypothesis: If φ is the root of some argument tree φ ∈ T of height at most h, then [[pi(φ)]]V ∈
Fn(T) for some degree n = I(S) and for every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,sum,max〉.
Induction step: Suppose that φ is the root of some argument tree φ ∈ T of height h+ 1 with direct
children A1, ...,Am. Since T is closed, A1, ...,Am are roots of argument trees in T of height at most h.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, [[pi(Ai)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, n = I(S), and every telescoping
structure T = 〈T,O,sum,max〉. By Proposition 4.2, pi(R(T )) ⊂ Fn(T) including the rules labelling the
arcs from A1, ...Am to φ . It follows then that [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,
sum,max〉.
We now use Lemmas 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 to relate the notions of graded consequence in LogAG and
supported wffs in argument structures.
Theorem 4.1. For any argument structure T and n = I(S) where S ∈℘(RNM) contains all the non-
monotonic rules appearing as arc labels in T , if φ ∈W f f (T ), then TIR |'C pi(φ) for some grading canon
C= 〈⊗,⊕,n〉 where ⊗= sum and ⊕= max.
Proof. Suppose that φ ∈W f f (T ), then by the definition of W f f (T ) it must be one of the following three
cases.
1. φ is a base fact. By lemma 1, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T) for all n and every telescoping structure T =
〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉. Hence, by Definition 2.11, TIR |'C pi(φ) for some grading canon C = 〈sum,max,n〉
where n = I(S).
2. φ is a root of some argument with all arcs labelled by monotonic rules. By lemma 2, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈
Fn(T) for all n and every telescoping structure T= 〈T,O,⊗,⊕〉. Hence, by Definition 2.11, TIR |'C
pi(φ) for some grading canon C= 〈sum,max,n〉 where n = I(S).
3. φ is a root of some argument with all arcs labelled by non-monotonic rules. By lemma 3, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈
Fn(T) for n = I(S) and every telescoping structure T = 〈T,O,sum,max,〉. Hence, by Definition
2.11, TIR |'C pi(φ) for some grading canon C= 〈sum,max,n〉.
Since the results in [19] showing that default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, and the
principle of negation as failure are all special cases of argument systems utilize the notion of complete-
ness with respect to a wff φ , we need to relate the same notion to our notion of graded consequence. The
following corollary does exactly that and follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.1. If T is complete with respect to φ , then TIR |'C φ or TR |'C ¬φ for some grading canon
C= 〈⊗,⊕,n〉 where ⊗= sum and ⊕= max.
It turns out, however, that if TIR |'C pi(φ) with C = 〈sum,max,n〉 and n = I(S), it is not necessarily
the case that φ ∈W f f (T ). This is mainly because, given our construction in Definition 4.2, the rules
in R(T ) are graded consequences of TIR at level n but are not in W f f (T ) as the rules appearing as arc
labels in T are never in W f f (T ). Further, our construction maps all monotonic rules in R including
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the monotonic rules not in R(T ) to LogAG propositional terms in MR. Such monotonic rules will also be
graded consequences ofTIR at level n but are not in W f f (T ). For this reason, Theorem 4.2 presents a more
general result. We prove that if TIR |'C pi(φ) then pi(φ) must be a logical consequence of pi(R(T )∪R′M)
where R′M is a maximal subset of RM consistent with R(T ). It is important to note here that pi(W f f (T ))
is a subset of the set of logical consequences of pi(R(T )∪R′M).
Theorem 4.2. For any argument structure T and n = I(S) where S ∈℘(RNM) contains all the non-
monotonic rules appearing as arc labels in T , if TIR |'C pi(φ) for a grading canon C = 〈sum,max,n〉,
then pi(φ) is a logical consequence of pi(R(T )∪R′M).
Proof. Suppose that TIR |'C pi(φ) with C= 〈sum,max,n〉. Then, [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ Fn(T). According to Propo-
sition 4.1, Fn(T) = F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT). We have four cases.
1. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ V(MR). In this case, φ is either a base fact or a monotonic rule in R. If φ is a base
fact, then it must be in W f f (T ) by the definition of argument structures (and hence pi(φ) a logical
consequence of R(T )). If φ is a monotonic rule appearing as an arc label in T , then φ ∈ R(T ).
Otherwise, if φ is a monotonic rule that does not appear as an arc label in T , then φ ∈ R′M. In the
three cases, pi(φ) is a logical consequence of pi(R(T )∪R′M).
2. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ ERn. In this case, pi(φ) must be a non-monotonic rule embedded at level n whose
negation is not embedded at level n. Hence, φ ∈ S and φ ∈ R(T ) by the definition of R(T ). Hence,
pi(φ) ∈ pi(R(T )).
3. [[pi(φ)]]V ∈ GT . This can not be as φ must be a grading term and grading terms are never in R.
4. [[φ ]]V ∈ F(V(MR) ∪ ERn ∪ GT). It follows from the previous three cases and the monotonicity
of filters that pi(φ) is a logical consequence of pi(R(T )∪R′M).
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to present an algebraic graded non-monotonic logic we refer to as LogAG
capable of encompassing a wide variety of non-monotonic logical formalisms. We showed how argument
systems can be encoded in LogAG, and proved that the LogAG logical consequence relation captures the
notion of supported propositions in argument structures. Since default logic, autoepistemic logic, cir-
cumscription, the principle of negation as failure are all proved to be special cases of argument systems,
our results show that LogAG captures such the previously-mentioned non-monotonic logics as well. Pre-
vious results show that LogAG subsumes possibilistic logic and any non-monotonic inference relation
satisfying Makinson’s rationality postulates. This proves the universality of LogAG as a non-monotonic
logic. To the best of our knowledge, LogAG is the only framework in the literature that was shown to
capture weighted approaches to non-monotonicity such as possibilistic logic in addition to the classi-
cal previously- mentioned approaches. In this way, LogAG provides a powerful unified framework for
non-monotonicity.
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